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 The Death Penalty on the Streets: What the 
Eighth Amendment Can Teach About 
Regulating Police Use of Force 
Jelani Jefferson Exum* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The use of force by police officers has traditionally been analyzed 
through the lens of Fourth Amendment reasonableness.1  The Supreme Court 
has decided that the proper question regarding the excessiveness of police 
force is whether the police officer acted as a reasonable law enforcement 
officer.2  When that police force is fatal – what this Article deems the death 
penalty on the streets – the legal question is the same, leaving us with an 
analysis that requires a heavy reliance on the officer’s version of events and a 
host of disagreement on what constitutes appropriate police action.3  Reason-
able minds can, and do, disagree on what constitutes reasonable police action 
because the reasonableness standard is divorced from any notion of what 
procedures police ought to follow before turning to deadly force.  The August 
 
* Jelani Jefferson Exum is a Professor at the University of Toledo College of Law.  
This Article was inspired by the author’s TEDxToledo talk.  Jelani Jefferson Exum, 
The Death Penalty on the Street, YOUTUBE (Oct. 10, 2014), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sq7eAEjJm6U.  Professor Jefferson Exum wishes 
to thank Will Lucas for inviting her to participate in TEDxToledo for a second year 
and for his encouragement as she prepared for the event.  She would also like to ex-
tend a special thank you to Lowen Exum for his contribution to the title of her talk 
and her paper, and for his continual support.  Further, Professor Jefferson Exum 
would like to express appreciation to Professor Jalila Jefferson-Bullock, Professor 
Jamila Jefferson-Jones, Nailah Jefferson, Dr. Akilah Jefferson, and Dr. Andrea Jeffer-
son for their assistance as she developed this idea.  Professor Jefferson Exum also 
appreciates the comments that she received on this Article from the participants of the 
2015 Missouri Law Review Symposium, “Policing, Protesting, and Perceptions: A 
Critical Examination of the Events in Ferguson” – especially Professors Frank Bow-
man, Seth Stoughton, and Wesley Oliver. 
 1. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 386 (1989). 
 2. Id. at 397. 
 3. The author recognizes that the death penalty in the court system is rife with 
problems, from racial disparity to wrongful convictions.  See Race and the Death 
Penalty, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/race-and-death-penalty (last visited Oct. 9, 
2015); The Causes of Wrongful Conviction, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes-wrongful-conviction (last visited Oct. 9, 
2015).  This Article, however, uses the death penalty context to show that, at least 
when there is a proclaimed value for human dignity, the result is the development of 
procedures meant to spare human life.  It is this focus on saving lives that is what the 
author believes can be learned from the death penalty and hopes will be integrated 
into the police use of force jurisprudence. 
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9, 2014 killing of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, and countless un-
armed others before and since him who have lost their lives at the hands of 
police, brings this unsatisfactory analysis to the forefront.4  The lack of clarity 
in the use of force reasonableness standard often leads to reasonableness be-
ing the default legal conclusion in cases brought against police officers, leav-
ing victims of deadly police force without justice. 
This Article offers punishment as another lens through which to view 
police force.  The Supreme Court has consistently rejected arguments that the 
Eighth Amendment is the appropriate vehicle for dealing with excessive po-
lice force claims.5  However, reconceptualizing the use of deadly force by 
police officers as punishment provides a new understanding of the gravity of 
deadly police force and adds necessary substance to the reasonableness analy-
sis.  When police force is likened to punishment, the use of fatal force by 
police officers can be considered the administration of the death penalty on 
the streets, absent the procedural protections and focus on human dignity 
given in the criminal justice system through the Eighth Amendment.6  When 
considered in the context of punishment, the reasonableness analysis can be 
transformed to incorporate the value of human dignity and focus on protec-
tions against fatal police force that ought to be in place to protect the lives of 
all individuals. 
This Article argues that the reasonableness standard applied to deadly 
police force must ask whether a police officer was able to, and did, use non-
fatal force before turning to deadly force.  It is with an eye to this more rea-
soned approach to reasonableness that this Article builds a case for incorpo-
rating Eighth Amendment values into the Fourth Amendment reasonableness 
analysis of excessive police force.  Part II of this Article criticizes the tradi-
tional Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis and argues that, rather than 
assessing how a reasonable officer would handle a situation, we can redefine 
the focus of the inquiry to the types of methods employed to avoid the loss of 
life.  In Part II, the stories of Michael Brown and others are explored in order 
to show the unreasonableness of the current reasonableness standard for 
claims of excessive police force.  Part III of the Article compares police force 
to punishment and explains that, by applying an Eighth Amendment “respect 
for human dignity” standard to analyze the use of fatal force by police offic-
ers, we can avoid some of the pitfalls of the current excessiveness analysis.  
As Part IV explains, the Supreme Court goes to great lengths to spare the 
lives of even our criminals.  Part IV also discusses the protections given de-
fendants in the death penalty context in order to show that the death penalty 
 
 4. For a non-exhaustive list of just seventy-six of those who fell victim to dead-
ly police force, see Rich Juzwiak & Aleksander Chan, Unarmed People of Color 
Killed By Police, 1999–2004, GAWKER (Dec. 8, 2014, 2:15 PM), http://gawker.com/
unarmed-people-of-color-killed-by-police-1999-2014-1666672349. 
 5. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 398–99 (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 
671 n.40 (1977)). 
 6. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972) (“A punishment is ‘cruel and 
unusual,’ therefore, if it does not comport with human dignity.”). 
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procedures developed by the Supreme Court are based upon its view that the 
Eighth Amendment requires a respect for human dignity, which is in stark 
contrast to the death penalty on the streets.  When the government is permit-
ted to take an individual’s life, it must do so in a manner that respects that 
life.  Finally, this Article concludes by positing that procedures and guide-
lines regarding non-fatal uses of force must be followed before an officer can 
reasonably take the life of an individual.  In this way, the death penalty on the 
streets will be a form of punishment that is narrowly applied and respectful of 
the lives of all people, no matter their behavior. 
II.  THE UNREASONABLE REASONABLENESS ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court has made it clear that claims of excessive police 
force will be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s protection against un-
reasonable seizures.7  This inattention to the actual consequences of deadly 
police force indicates the Supreme Court’s lack of awareness of the true na-
ture of fatal police force – that it is more akin to punishment than to a simple 
seizure.  While it may be that police officers have seized a person when they 
use force against that person,8 by limiting police force cases to the traditional 
Fourth Amendment analysis, the Supreme Court has left us with situations in 
which unarmed individuals have been killed by police officers with no find-
ing of excessive force.  A closer look at the reasonableness standard reveals 
its shortcomings. 
A.  The Traditional Fourth Amendment Reasonable Force Standard 
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that “the two primary sources of 
constitutional protection against physically abusive governmental conduct” 
are the Fourth and Eighth Amendments.9  However, in the 1989 case, Gra-
ham v. Connor, the Court explicitly held that “all claims that law enforce-
ment officers have used excessive force—deadly or not—in the course of an 
arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be ana-
lyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard[.]”10  
Therefore, when a party claims excessive police force, determining the rea-
sonableness of the police action will “be judged from the perspective of a 
reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hind-
sight.”11  The Court has elaborated that this reasonableness inquiry “is an 
objective one: the question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively 
 
 7. See Graham, 490 U.S. 386. 
 8. A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs when an officer restrains the freedom 
of a person to walk away.  See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 
(1975) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968)). 
 9. Graham, 490 U.S. at 394. 
 10. Id. at 395. 
 11. Id. at 396 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 20–22). 
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reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without 
regard to their underlying intent or motivation.”12  Ultimately, then, the rea-
sonableness of police force will turn on the point of view of the particular 
officers involved, judged against the actions of a “reasonable officer” – an 
officer who does not act with excessive force. 
Of course, a reasonable police officer does not use deadly force in every 
encounter with an unruly suspect.  The National Institute of Justice explains 
police force options in this manner: 
Law enforcement officers should use only the amount of force neces-
sary to mitigate an incident, make an arrest, or protect themselves or 
others from harm.  The levels, or continuum, of force police use in-
clude basic verbal and physical restraint, less-lethal force, and lethal 
force.13 
Even with this array of options available to officers, the traditional 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard leaves open the possibility of the 
legal use of deadly force by police officers in certain situations.  Five years 
before the Supreme Court decided Graham, it had already tackled the deadly 
force issue under a Fourth Amendment analysis.  In Tennessee v. Garner, the 
Court considered “the constitutionality of the use of deadly force to prevent 
the escape of an apparently unarmed suspected felon.”14  In that case, two 
police officers were dispatched to investigate an ongoing home invasion.15  
One of the officers spotted the suspect fleeing across the backyard of the tar-
geted home.16  Although the officer was “reasonably sure” that the suspect, 
Edward Garner, did not have a weapon, the officer shot Garner in the back of 
the head as he began to climb over a fence.17  The officer explained that he 
felt convinced that if he did not shoot Garner, he would escape.18  Garner 
died at the hospital.19  The Court, analyzing the claim of excessive force us-
ing the Fourth Amendment, held that deadly force “may not be used unless it 
is necessary to prevent the escape and the officer has probable cause to be-
 
 12. Id. at 397 (citing Scott v. United States, 437 U.S. 128, 137–39 (1978); Terry, 
392 U.S. at 21). 
 13. Police Use of Force, NAT’L INST. JUST., http://www.nij.gov/topics/law-
enforcement/officer-safety/use-of-force/pages/welcome.aspx (last modified Apr. 13, 
2015). 
 14. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 4. 
 17. Id. at 3–4 (“In using deadly force to prevent the escape, [the officer] was 
acting under the authority of a Tennessee statute and pursuant to Police Department 
policy.  The statute provides that ‘[i]f, after notice of the intention to arrest the de-
fendant, he either flee or forcibly resist, the officer may use all the necessary means to 
effect the arrest.’”). 
 18. Id. at 4. 
 19. Id. 
4
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lieve that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical 
injury to the officer or others.”20  In this particular case, the Court determined 
that deadly force was unreasonable because the officer did not have probable 
cause to believe that the unarmed Garner posed any danger to officers or the 
public.21  The Court did not, however, condemn the use of deadly force alto-
gether. 
In explaining its conclusion, the Garner Court made several observa-
tions about the use of deadly force by police officers.  On the nature of deadly 
force, the Court explained: 
[N]otwithstanding probable cause to seize a suspect, an officer may 
not always do so by killing him.  The intrusiveness of a seizure by 
means of deadly force is unmatched.  The suspect’s fundamental in-
terest in his own life need not be elaborated upon.  The use of deadly 
force also frustrates the interest of the individual, and of society, in 
judicial determination of guilt and punishment.22  
Thus, the Court recognized the severity of deadly force and the narrow 
circumstances in which killing a suspect is reasonable.  The Supreme Court, 
in Garner, also discussed the limited effectiveness of deadly force to accom-
plish criminal justice goals: 
[W]e are not convinced that the use of deadly force is a sufficiently 
productive means of accomplishing them to justify the killing of non-
violent suspects.  The use of deadly force is a self-defeating way of 
apprehending a suspect and so setting the criminal justice mechanism 
in motion.  If successful, it guarantees that that mechanism will not be 
set in motion.23  
Despite seemingly recognizing the gravity of deadly force, and the fact 
that killing a suspect robs that suspect and society of the opportunity to have 
the criminal justice system do its job, the Supreme Court, by applying a tradi-
tional Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis to excessive force claims, 
has not effectively protected the individual’s “fundamental interest” in their 
own lives.  Instead, it has left us with a standard that leads to inconsistent, 
and often disappointing, outcomes.  It only takes a survey of recent reports of 
killings by police officers for that failed protection to become apparent. 
   
 
 20. Id. at 3. 
 21. Id. at 21. 
 22. Id. at 9 (emphasis added). 
 23. Id. at 10 (citation omitted). 
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B.  Reasonableness as an Unsatisfying Standard 
In Garner, the Court admitted that the criminal justice mechanism does 
not get the chance to operate when a suspect is killed by a police officer.  
This death penalty on the streets – when police officers kill individuals as 
punishment for that person’s objectionable behavior – operates outside of the 
procedural safeguards of the criminal justice system.  When the only constitu-
tional standard regulating use of force by police is a reasonableness standard 
that is informed by the judgment of police officers, the result is limited jus-
tice.  This is especially true for those who have lost their lives in police en-
counters when that loss of life could have been safely avoided by the use of 
non-fatal police tactics.  The tragedies of Michael Brown, and other unarmed 
individuals who have been killed by police officers who were not punished 
for their actions, demonstrate the incompleteness of the reasonableness stand-
ard. 
1.  Michael Brown: A Reasonable End? 
The story of Michael Brown illustrates the consequences of a traditional 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis.  On August 9, 2014, Officer 
Darren Wilson shot and killed eighteen-year-old Michael Brown – an un-
armed black male – in Ferguson, Missouri, a suburb of St. Louis.24  Though 
in the weeks following the shooting it was alleged that Michael had robbed a 
convenience store just before his encounter with Officer Wilson, Police Chief 
Tom Jackson reported after the shooting that Officer Wilson was not aware of 
the alleged robbery.25  Rather, Officer Wilson first approached Michael for 
standing in the street and impeding traffic.26  It is at this point that questions 
 
 24. For a comprehensive explanation of the Michael Brown shooting, see Larry 
Buchanan et al., Report: What Happened in Ferguson, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/03/04/us/report-what-happened-in-
ferguson.html. 
 25. See Joe Millitzer & Vera Culley, Chief Jackson: The Convenience Store 
Robbery and Michael Brown Shooting Not Connected, FOX2NOW (Aug. 15, 2014, 
2:56 PM), http://fox2now.com/2014/08/15/live-updates-ferguson-police-chief-tom-
jackson-speaks-at-a-press-conference/. 
 26. In his grand jury testimony, Officer Wilson explained what caught his atten-
tion about Michael Brown: 
 
I see them walking down the middle of the street.  And first thing that struck 
me was they’re walking in the middle of the street.  I had already seen a cou-
ple cars trying to pass, but they couldn’t have traffic normal because they 
were in the middle, so one had to stop to let the car go around and then anoth-
er car would come. 
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about reasonableness arise and color perceptions of whether Officer Wilson’s 
use of deadly force was constitutionally permissible.  To some, any killing of 
an unarmed suspect is unreasonable and, thus, excessive force.  This position 
was bolstered by various witness accounts that Michael had his hands up, in 
surrender, when he was fatally shot by Officer Wilson.27  To others, Officer 
Wilson acted completely reasonably when he shot Michael, after Michael 
allegedly wrestled the Officer for his gun, ran away, and then came charging 
back at the Officer in a rage.28  The protests, riots, and debates that ensued 
served as a media attraction for months, giving the world prime seats from 
which to watch the reasonableness analysis unfold. 
Though this case never went to the Supreme Court for a statement on 
the reasonableness standard – in fact, no criminal charges were ever filed in 
this case – the reasonableness analysis is embedded in the Missouri law that 
was presented to a St. Louis County grand jury.  On August 20, 2014, a grand 
jury was convened to review possible charges against Officer Wilson.29  The 
grand jury met regularly for three months, and on November 24, 2014, decid-
ed not to indict Officer Wilson.30  There has been speculation about whether 
the unclear instructions given to the grand jury muddled the legal analysis 
enough to confuse jurors about when deadly force is deemed legal under Mis-
souri law.31  Missouri Revised Statute Section 563.046 allows a law enforce-
ment officer to use deadly force to effect the arrest or prevent the escape of a 
criminal suspect “[w]hen he reasonably believes that such use of deadly force 
is immediately necessary to effect the arrest and also reasonably believes that 
the person to be arrested . . . [h]as committed or attempted to commit a felo-
ny.”32  However, this portion of the statute conflicts with the directive given 
by the Supreme Court on the use of deadly force in Tennessee v. Garner.33  
Therefore, the Missouri Approved Instructions have been revised to explain 
to jurors that police officers can use deadly force to carry out an arrest or 
prevent a suspect’s escape only when that officer “reasonably believes” that 
the suspect is attempting to flee using a deadly weapon or that the suspect 
 
 27. See Buchanan et al., supra note 24. 
 28. See Greg Toppo, Support Spreads for Officer in Ferguson Shooting, USA 
TODAY (Aug. 20, 2014, 7:18 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/
08/19/officer-supporters-ferguson-shooting/14259993/. 
 29. See Buchanan et al., supra note 24. 
 30. Ryan J. Reilly, Ferguson Officer Darren Wilson Not Indicted in Michael 
Brown Shooting, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2014/11/24/michael-brown-grand-jury_n_6159070.html. 
 31. William Freivogel, Grand Jury Wrangled With Confusing Instructions, ST. 
LOUIS PUB. RADIO (Nov. 26, 2014), http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/grand-jury-
wrangled-confusing-instructions. 
 32. MO. REV. STAT. § 563.046.3(2) (2000). 
 33. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985) (concluding that deadly force 
“may not be used unless it is necessary to prevent the escape and the officer has prob-
able cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious 
physical injury to the officer or others”). 
7
Exum and Telman: The Death Penalty on the Streets
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
994 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
“may endanger life or inflict serious physical injury unless arrested without 
delay.”34  The problem in the Darren Wilson case is that prosecutors gave the 
jurors both statements of the law at different times in the process.35  In either 
iteration of the law, however, the reasonableness standard was present. 
Given the erroneous instruction, the confusion for the jury would have 
been with what Officer Wilson was required to reasonably believe – that 
deadly force was necessary to conduct the arrest of Michael Brown, or that 
Michael was a threat to the officer or the public if he was not contained by 
Officer Wilson.  The question that was not asked was whether Officer Wilson 
followed non-fatal encounter procedures before resorting to deadly force.  
This is, of course, because the law does not require such an inquiry.  Instead, 
the jurors’ only task was to mull over the reasonableness of Officer Wilson’s 
actions – a judgment over which the nation was sharply divided.  Even if the 
jury instructions had been clear, the legal weakness in the case, as in all ex-
cessive force cases, would have remained.  This is because there is no con-
sensus on what constitutes reasonable force by a police officer.  And, when 
this issue finds itself in the national spotlight, as Michael Brown’s death 
shows, the resolution is rarely widely satisfying. 
This disagreement regarding the reasonableness of Officer Darren Wil-
son’s actions sparked a national “Hands Up” movement against police vio-
lence that garnered international attention.36  Protests following Michael 
Brown’s death and other killings by police officers have included die-ins, 
with sometimes hundreds of people lying on sidewalks, the floors of shop-
ping centers, and even lining the corridors of capitol buildings.  These die-ins 
have painted a striking visual of the lives lost at the hands of police officers, 
and, most importantly, signaled to lawmakers and policymakers that, in the 
view of the protesters, the killings clearly have been unreasonable.37  The 
 
 34. MAI-CR 3d 306.14. 
 35. For an excellent explanation of the confused legal standard used in the Dar-
ren Wilson grand jury proceedings, see NAACP Legal Defense Fund Open Letter to 
Judge Maura McShane, NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE FUND 3–6 (Jan. 5, 2015), 
http://www.naacpldf.org/files/case_issue/NAACP%20LDF%20Letter%20to%20Judg
e%20Maura%20McShane.pdf. 
 36. See HANDS UP UNITED, http://www.handsupunited.org/ (last visited Oct. 2, 
2015); The Movement, HANDSUPDONTSHOOT, http://handsupdontshoot.com/about/
the-movement/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2015). 
 37. For news accounts of these protests, see ‘Die-In’ Protest Held on Delmar 
Loop, CBS ST. LOUIS (Nov. 16, 2014, 4:40 PM), http://stlouis.cbslocal.com/2014/11/
16/die-in-protest-held-on-delmar-loop/; Yamiche Alcindor, Demonstrators Stage 
‘Die-In’ at NYC Apple Store, Macy’s, USA TODAY (Dec. 6, 2014, 11:13 AM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/12/05/protests-apple-store-new-
york/19975797/; Christine O’Donnell, Hundreds of Lawyers Stage ‘Die-In’ to Protest 
Police Brutality, DOUG’S DIARY (Dec. 16, 2014, 2:45 PM), https://dougsdiary.
wordpress.com/2014/12/17/hundreds-of-lawyers-stage-die-in-to-protest-police-
brutality/; Cristina Fletes-Boutte, ‘Die-In’ at Missouri State Capitol, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.stltoday.com/news/multimedia/die-in-at-
missouri-state-capitol/image_cef4a783-835b-56ac-a2aa-a263d467e3eb.html; Em-
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phenomenon #BlackLivesMatter became not just a trending issue on Twitter, 
but a movement and a clear call for a focus on human dignity in the police 
use of force debate.38 
On the other side of the wide divide was considerable support for Of-
ficer Wilson in the form of online support groups and over $100,000 raised 
for him and his family.39  This stark division is evidence of the faultiness of 
the reasonableness standard.  There is no consensus on what constitutes rea-
sonable police action.  This confusion is not just evidenced by the split public 
opinion on the use of fatal force by police officers, but also by the incon-
sistent legal response to those situations. 
2.  Other Cases Showing the Emptiness of the Reasonableness        
Approach 
When it comes to the traditional reasonableness analysis of police force, 
there is no standard at all.  Reasonableness often seems to be the default con-
clusion, even when the individual killed is unarmed, and even when that indi-
vidual was committing either no criminal offense, or an extremely minor one.  
One such famous case of a controversial police shooting is that of Amadou 
Diallo, who was killed by four New York City police officers in 1999.40  He 
was a twenty-two-year-old West African immigrant with no criminal record 
and was unarmed at the time of his death.41  The officers, who were in un-
marked cars and dressed in street clothes, happened upon Mr. Diallo as he 
stood in the entrance of the apartment building where he lived.42  At their trial 
for the homicide, the officers testified that Mr. Diallo was acting suspiciously 
and that he did not yield to their commands to stop, but instead ran inside of 
the building when they approached.43  The officers claimed that they began 
 
marie Huetteman, Protesters Stage ‘Die-In’ at Capitol, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2015/01/21/protesters-stage-die-in-at-
capitol/. 
 38. See BLACK LIVES MATTER, http://blacklivesmatter.com/ (last visited Oct. 2, 
2015). 
 39. See Julia Talanova, Support grows for Darren Wilson, officer who shot Fer-
guson teen Michael Brown, CNN (Sept. 8, 2014), http://edition.cnn.com/2014/08/19/
us/ferguson-darren-wilson-support/index.html; Paige Lavender, ‘Support Officer 
Darren Wilson’ GoFundMe Raises Over $137,000 For Cop Who Shot Michael 
Brown, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 21, 2014, 2:59 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/21/darren-wilson-
gofundme_n_5698013.html. 
 40. Jane Fritsch, The Diallo Verdict: The Overview; 4 Officers in Diallo Shoot-
ing Are Acquitted Of All Charges, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2000), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/02/26/nyregion/diallo-verdict-overview-4-officers-
diallo-shooting-are-acquitted-all-charges.html. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
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firing upon him because they thought he was reaching for a gun.44  Mr. Diallo 
was unarmed and was reaching for his wallet.45  Officers fired forty-one shots 
at him, and he was hit nineteen times.46  All of the officers involved in the 
shooting were acquitted,47 leaving many confused as to how a jury truly could 
have found the officers’ actions to be reasonable.  Certainly shooting and 
killing Mr. Diallo was not necessary to subdue him, and the officers were 
never in danger because Mr. Diallo was unarmed.  Despite the officers’ 
claims of a mistaken belief that Mr. Diallo was reaching for a gun, forty-one 
shots fired for a gun that was never seen can certainly be considered unrea-
sonable.  However, because there is no clear protocol saying that officers 
cannot do this, the default reasonableness position prevailed. 
Conflicting jury decisions, police department reviews, and civil suit 
awards in police violence cases reveal that the reasonableness standard has no 
clear basis in expected police behavior.  For example, the January 29, 2012 
police shooting of Aaron Campbell in Portland, Oregon, ended in three con-
flicting results: (1) a grand jury declining to indict the officers; (2) internal 
discipline of the officers; and (3) a civil rights suit victory for Campbell’s 
family.48  The twenty-five-year-old Campbell was shot while leaving the 
Sandy Terrace apartment building.49  Police were responding to a call to 
check on the welfare of a suicidal, armed man.50  In what has become a famil-
iar story in these cases of fatal police force, officers claimed that they be-
lieved Campbell was reaching for a gun when Officer Ron Frashour shot 
him.51  Campbell was unarmed.52  After deciding not to indict the officers, the 
grand jury members released a three-page letter to the District Attorney indi-
cating their “outrage” with Officer Frashour’s actions.53  The grand jury 
members explained: 
[W]e the grand jury determined that we could not indict Officer Ron 
Frashour on any criminal charge.  That is not to say that we found him 
innocent, agreed with his decisions, or found that the police incident at 
Sandy Terrace was without flaw.  What we found was that Officer 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Maxine Bernstein, Portland Police Training Review Drafts of Frashour 
Shooting Show How Lieutenant’s Analysis Changed, OREGONIAN (Oct. 15, 2012, 8:26 
PM), http://projects.oregonlive.com/focus/campbell/. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Letter from Multnomah Cty. Grand Jury to Michael D. Schrunk, Dist. Attor-
ney, Multnomah Cty. (Feb. 10, 2010), http://www.scribd.com/doc/27133490/Aaron-
Campbell-Grand-Jury-Letter. 
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Frashour’s actions were consistent with the relevant laws and statutes 
regarding the use of deadly force by a police officer.54  
According to the letter, the “flaw” in the police incident turned out to be 
several deficiencies, including “flawed police policies, incomplete or inap-
propriate training, incomplete communication, and other issues with the po-
lice effort.”55  The grand jury members’ own concerns about the case calls 
into question their decision to find that the officer truly acted reasonably in 
killing Campbell.  Rather, the grand jury found that the law allowing an of-
ficer to kill an individual if the officer “believed he or his fellow officers were 
in imminent danger” allowed Officer Frashour to kill Campbell while simul-
taneously admitting the grand jury’s belief that “Aaron Campbell should not 
have died that day.”56  Clearly, the prevailing sentiment was that the officer 
did not act appropriately, yet because the reasonableness standard only focus-
es on the officer’s belief without regard to proper protocol, the result is no 
criminal liability. 
The internal discipline and civil award in Aaron Campbell’s case also 
suggests faultiness in the traditional reasonableness approach to the use of 
force by police officers.  While the grand jury declined to find criminal liabil-
ity for the officers, an internal investigation by the Portland Police Depart-
ment found that “it was not reasonable for Officer Frashour to believe that 
Aaron Campbell posed an immediate threat of death or serious physical inju-
ry, which is what bureau policy and training requires.”57  According to the 
investigation: “Campbell did not come out of the apartment with a weapon 
drawn or in view.  His hands were clasped together on top of his head and 
remained there.  He walked backward toward officers and followed com-
mands to stop, walk slowly, and stop again.”58  All of this showed that, con-
trary to the grand jury conclusion, Officer Frashour’s decision to kill Camp-
bell was not based on a reasonable perception of a deadly threat, but instead 
on the officer being “so focused on his perception of Campbell as a threat 
with a gun” that he failed to follow proper use of force protocol instituted by 
his department.59  The department report relayed several alternatives to dead-
ly force that could have – and apparently should have – been used by the of-
ficer in this particular situation.60  As a result of the report, Portland’s mayor 
and police chief decided to fire Officer Farshour and to suspend three other 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. USE OF FORCE REVIEW BD., PORTLAND POLICE BUREAU, INTERNAL 
INVESTIGATION: AARON MARCELL CAMPBELL 1 (Nov. 2010), 
http://www.portlandonline.com/police/images/10-
8352/UOFRB_report_Campbell.pdf. 
 58. Id. at 1–2. 
 59. Id. at 2. 
 60. The report spoke of the use of a beanbag strike, as well as a K9 option.  Id. 
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officers involved in the incident.61  The mayor’s view of the incident led to 
the city of Portland agreeing to pay $1.2 million to Campbell’s family to set-
tle a civil rights suit.62  The internal investigation and civil award show that 
when reasonableness is looked at from the point of view of protocol and non-
fatal force alternatives, certain police killings are clearly unreasonable, even 
when the traditional Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard leaves that 
clarity in doubt.  This inadequacy of the reasonableness standard supports the 
view that deadly police force ought to be considered as more than simply a 
Fourth Amendment seizure that can be handled with the traditional, officer-
point-of-view-focused reasonableness analysis. 
III.  PUNISHMENT: A MORE REASONABLE APPROACH 
When the true consequences of police force are acknowledged – that in-
dividuals are being executed for their perceived objectionable response to a 
police encounter – it becomes apparent that losing one’s life at the hands of 
police officers is more akin to punishment than to a seizure.  Rather than 
leaning on a standardless reasonableness analysis, there is much that can be 
learned from the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment death penalty analysis.  
The same respect for human life that fuels the protections and guarantees 
given in the death penalty context can be incorporated into the reasonableness 
standard that now governs excessive force claims. 
A.  Viewing Police Force as Punishment 
Although the Eighth Amendment purports to protect us from brutal pun-
ishment, the Supreme Court has taken the unnecessarily narrow approach of 
explicitly limiting the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause to post-conviction punishment.  In cases concerning police force, the 
Court has cited to its decision in Ingraham v. Wright63 to conclude that the 
Eighth Amendment does not apply.  For instance, relying on Ingraham, the 
Court curtly stated in Graham that the “Eighth Amendment standard applies 
‘only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees tradi-
tionally associated with criminal prosecutions.’”64  Therefore, the Graham 
Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment, rather than the Eighth Amend-
ment, is the constitutional provision under which to analyze claims of exces-
sive police force.  However, adopting the Ingraham view of the Eighth 
 
 61. Cop Fired, 3 Suspended for Campbell Shooting, KGW PORTLAND (Nov. 17, 
2010, 5:26 AM), http://www.kgw.com/story/news/2014/07/21/11785336/. 
 62. Maxine Bernstein, Portland to Pay $1.2 Million to Settle Civil Rights Suit in 
Aaron Campbell Shooting, OREGONIAN (Feb. 1, 2012, 8:58 PM), 
http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2012/02/portland_to_pay_12_million_
to.html. 
 63. 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977). 
 64. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 398–99 (1989) (citing Ingraham, 430 U.S. 
at 671 n.40). 
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Amendment in police force cases devalues the importance of the analysis in 
Ingraham that led the Court to hold that the Eighth Amendment was inappli-
cable.  A closer look at the Ingraham Court’s observations regarding corporal 
punishment against students reveals the Graham Court’s error in determining 
that Ingraham stands for the inapplicability of the Eighth Amendment to po-
lice force as well. 
The narrow holding in Ingraham was that the Eighth Amendment’s pro-
tection against cruel and unusual punishment was inapplicable in the case of 
corporal punishment of public school children.65  Though the Court went 
through a discussion of the history of the Eighth Amendment, it did so mostly 
to show the Amendment’s intended connection to the criminal process.  The 
Ingraham Court noted that the issues covered by the Eighth Amendment – 
bails, fines, and punishment – were associated with the criminal process.66  
Thus, the Court reasoned, “[B]y subjecting the three [issues] to parallel limi-
tations the text of the Amendment suggests an intention to limit the power of 
those entrusted with the criminal-law function of government.”67  Therefore, 
the Court explained, the Eighth Amendment was not meant to apply to sanc-
tions unrelated to the criminal process, such as the discipline of schoolchil-
dren. 
However, unlike corporal punishment in public schools, police investi-
gation into criminal behavior is the starting point of this “criminal law func-
tion of government.”  The Supreme Court’s own recognition of such force as 
a Fourth Amendment seizure supports this view.  A seizure occurs when, due 
to police actions and the circumstances on the scene, “a reasonable person 
would have believed that he was not free to leave.”68  Situations in which po-
lice use force against an individual clearly fall within this definition as the 
Supreme Court has explained: 
Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure . . . would be 
the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon 
by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or 
the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with 
the officer’s request might be compelled.69  
   
 
 65. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 671.  The corporal punishment in Ingraham “consist-
ed of paddling the recalcitrant student on the buttocks with a flat wooden paddle 
measuring less than two feet long, three to four inches wide, and about one-half inch 
thick” and resulted in “no apparent physical injury to the student.”  Id. at 656–57. 
 66. Id. at 664. 
 67. Id. 
 68. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554–55 (1980). 
 69. Id. at 554 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968); Dunaway v. 
New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207, & n.6 (1979); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND 
SEIZURE 53–55 (1978)). 
13
Exum and Telman: The Death Penalty on the Streets
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
1000 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
Certainly, then, when an officer uses force – especially deadly force – 
against an individual, a Fourth Amendment seizure has occurred.  When a 
seizure occurs, it must be justified either by reasonable suspicion (for stops) 
or probable cause (for seizures amounting to the restrictiveness of an arrest).70  
The definitions of both reasonable suspicion and probable cause indicate the 
required connection between the seizure and criminal activity.   Reasonable 
suspicion requires an officer to have articulable facts “which lead[] him rea-
sonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be 
afoot.”71  Likewise, probable cause for an arrest requires officers to have 
“reasonably trustworthy information . . . sufficient to warrant a prudent man 
in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an of-
fense.”72  Thus, when officers seize a person using force – a seizure that re-
quires some level of suspicion of criminal activity – there is a clear connec-
tion to the criminal process, much unlike the paddling of schoolchildren. 
It is therefore faulty to not acknowledge that the force used by those law 
enforcement officials as they carry out their criminal law investigatory duty is 
a form of punishment.  Criminal punishment is imposed upon a person as a 
response to that person’s objectionable behavior – the violation of the crimi-
nal statutes of a particular jurisdiction.  Punishment is inflicted in order to 
deter criminal behavior, rehabilitate the criminal offender, incapacitate dan-
gerous individuals, express society’s desire for retribution against the law-
breaker, or any combination of these purposes of punishment.73  Likewise, 
when a law enforcement official seizes an individual, it is because of some 
perceived criminal violation committed by that individual.  In fact, it is that 
perception of objectionable behavior that legally justifies the seizure in the 
first place.  As previously explained, in order for the seizure of a person tan-
tamount to an arrest to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, it must 
be supported by probable cause.74  This means that an officer – or a magis-
trate in cases where a warrant is required – must determine that there is a “fair 
probability” that the individual has committed a criminal offense. 
In the case of Michael Brown, the alleged criminal offense was imped-
ing traffic.  And while Officer Wilson may have initially only needed reason-
able suspicion to stop Michael to inquire further, once deadly force was used, 
Michael’s seizure was elevated to an arrest, which would require probable 
 
 70. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014) (quoting Alabama v. White, 
496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (“The ‘reasonable suspicion’ necessary to justify such a 
stop ‘is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its 
degree of reliability.’”); Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004) (“In con-
formity with the rule at common law, a warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasona-
ble under the Fourth Amendment where there is probable cause to believe that a crim-
inal offense has been or is being committed.”). 
 71. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
 72. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). 
 73. ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAWS OF SENTENCING 17 (2d ed. 1991). 
 74. Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 152. 
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cause that he had committed an offense.75  According to Officer Wilson, at 
the point that deadly force was used, Michael’s objectionable behavior was 
threatening Officer Wilson’s life, which could be categorized as a host of 
criminal offenses – from assault to attempted murder.76  Thus, the deadly 
force used against Michael was in response to his perceived criminal behav-
ior.  In Officer Wilson’s version of the story, the lethal force was meant to 
deter Michael’s life threatening advance toward the officer.77  Officer Wil-
son’s account depicts Michael as an enraged monster, untamable by any 
amount of negotiation.78  Thus, any thought of a chance for rehabilitation 
would be futile.79  Further, as those who support Officer Wilson’s actions 
would argue, the allegedly outrageously threatening behavior displayed by 
Michael Brown was deserving of retribution.80  And, the shots that took Mi-
chael’s life were certainly meant to incapacitate him.81  Officer Darren Wil-
son, then, subjected Michael to a level of force that operated in the same 
manner as punishment. 
B.  New View of Reasonableness 
Even after acknowledging that police force is akin to punishment, the 
Supreme Court may still decline to apply the Eighth Amendment to excessive 
police force claims.  Perhaps the Court will decide, as it described in Ingra-
ham, that it has never applied the Eighth Amendment to punishment that oc-
curred before a criminal conviction and therefore will not begin doing so.82  
Such a conclusion, however, does not prevent the Supreme Court from incor-
 
 75. See California v. Hodari D, 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991) (“An arrest requires 
either physical force . . . or, where that is absent, submission to the assertion of au-
thority.”). 
 76. In his grand jury testimony, Officer Wilson alleged that Michael punched 
him in the face (Grand Jury Transcript, supra note 26, at 210:12–24), reached into his 
car (id. at 212:12–22), repeatedly swung at him (id. at 213:1–4 and 214:1–5), and 
grabbed the Officer’s gun (id. at 215:2–6 and 223:1–3). 
 77. In describing the first time he shot his gun while Michael was at his car, 
Officer Wilson explained thinking “this guy is going to kill me if he gets ahold of this 
gun.”  Id. at 224:10–12. 
 78. At one point in his grand jury testimony, Officer Wilson said that he felt 
“like a five-year-old holding onto Hulk Hogan.”  Id. at 212:18–22.  He also described 
Michael as looking like a “demon.”  Id. at 225:2–3. 
 79. Officer Wilson testified before the grand jury that as he fired a flurry of shots 
at Michael, the enraged suspect “looked like he was almost bulking up to run through 
the shots, like it was making him mad that I’m shooting at him.”  Id. at 228:19–21. 
 80. In describing the fatal series of shots, Officer Wilson said, “I remember look-
ing at my sites and firing, all I see is his head and that’s what I shot.”  Id. at 229:16–
18. 
 81. Officer Wilson described his last shot against Michael this way: “And then 
when it went into him, the demeanor on his face went blank, the aggression was gone, 
it was gone, I mean, I knew he stopped, the threat was stopped.”  Id. at 229:21–25. 
 82. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 666–68 (1977). 
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porating the Eighth Amendment’s values into the Fourth Amendment’s rea-
sonableness analysis. 
As already explained, the traditional Fourth Amendment reasonableness 
analysis for police force errs by focusing completely on the point of view of a 
“reasonable” officer.83  Deadly force can be used by an officer who reasona-
bly believes that such force is necessary to prevent the escape of a dangerous 
suspect.84  However, without regulations and procedures regarding meaning-
ful alternatives to deadly force, it is flawed to ask whether an officer reasona-
bly believes that deadly force is necessary.  In the officer’s point of view, of 
course, deadly force is necessary if that officer is frightened by the aggression 
or perceived aggression of the suspect.  Any officer looking at the situation 
from the outside may feel the same way because it is unclear what the alterna-
tives would be in those situations.  Should the officer retreat?  Use a taser?  
Call for back up?  Any of those options may be appropriate if the focus were 
on sparing the lives of suspects and on outfitting and training police officers 
in the use of non-lethal force.  In other words, the concept of “reasonable-
ness” has no real meaning if it is asked without regard to alternatives.  And it 
certainly has no meaning when it is asked without the existence of clear rules 
and procedures that regulate police action. 
If the Supreme Court continues to analyze police force under the Fourth 
Amendment only, there is still a need to give meaning to the “reasonable 
officer” standard.  This requires a clear understanding of what reasonable 
officers ought to do in certain situations.  As such standards are developed 
through procedures and regulations for the use of force by officers, the same 
concern for human dignity that the Supreme Court has read into the Eighth 
Amendment should fuel reforms of police conduct procedures.  Even the 
Department of Justice noted in its December 2014 investigation of the Cleve-
land Division of Police that “[t]he use of force by police should be guided by 
a respect for human life and human dignity.”85  Without necessarily throwing 
out the reasonableness analysis, procedural protections can be put in place to 
show that our country goes to great lengths to spare the lives of individuals, 
even in the death penalty on the streets. 
 
 83. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). 
 84. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985). 
 85. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE 
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IV.  RECONCEPTUALIZING THE PROBLEM: THE DEATH PENALTY ON 
THE STREETS 
In its Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment jurisprudence, 
the Supreme Court has stressed the importance of respecting human dignity.86  
The Court has explained that “the fundamental premise of the [cruel and unu-
sual punishment] Clause [is] that even the vilest criminal remains a human 
being possessed of common human dignity.”87  With this concept as motiva-
tion, the Supreme Court has developed a number of protections in capital 
cases – limiting the situations in which the death penalty can be imposed 
through the court system.  A brief review of some of these protections reveals 
the lengths that the American criminal justice system goes to in order to spare 
the lives of even those convicted of heinous crimes.  In other words, individ-
uals have a host of protections against the death penalty in the courts.  For 
instance, as is discussed below, the death penalty must be proportionate to the 
crime of conviction, and death cannot be a mandatory punishment.88  Howev-
er, when it comes to the death penalty on the streets – when death is imposed 
by police officers as a response to an individual’s objectionable behavior – 
procedural protections are nonexistent.  And, when the procedural protections 
of the death penalty in the courts are considered against the backdrop of the 
death penalty on the streets, it becomes quite apparent that the same concern 
for human dignity has not been, but should be, incorporated into the law 
against excessive police force. 
A.  The Death Penalty Must Be Proportional to the Crime 
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause to require proportionality between the crime 
committed and the punishment imposed.89  Thus, the Court has found that 
punishment is unconstitutionally excessive if it is “grossly out of proportion 
to the severity of the crime.”90  When it comes to the death penalty, the Court 
has described that form of punishment as “unique in its severity and irrevoca-
bility.”91  Due to this severity, the death penalty has been reserved for “those 
offenders who commit ‘a narrow category of the most serious crimes’ and 
whose extreme culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of execution.’”92  
 
 86. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972) (“A punishment is ‘cruel and 
unusual,’ therefore, if it does not comport with human dignity.”). 
 87. Id. at 273. 
 88. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 154 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 
428 U.S. 280, 280–81 (1976). 
 89. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 154. 
 90. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). 
 91. Id. at 598 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 154). 
 92. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008) (quoting Roper v. Sim-
mons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005)). 
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For this reason, the Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to uphold the 
death penalty in situations where the defendant did not intentionally cause the 
death of another human.93 
When it comes to police force, the disproportionality of using “irrevoca-
ble” deadly force against an individual suspected of committing a crime less 
severe than deliberate homicide has not found its way into the legal discourse.  
Of course, the justification used in cases of fatal police force, as previously 
explained, is that the officer reasonably believed that the suspect was about to 
use deadly force against the officer or others.94  However, when it comes to 
the death penalty in the court system, a reasonable belief that someone was 
planning to use deadly force against a victim is not enough to justify the im-
position of the death penalty upon that person.95  A criminal conviction re-
quires proof beyond a reasonable doubt,96 and even an attempted murder is 
not thought to be punishable by the death penalty.97  However, with the death 
penalty on the streets, even an officer’s mistaken belief that a suspect is plan-
ning to use deadly force has been enough to justify that officer killing the 
individual.  While statistics on the number of unarmed persons who have 
been killed by police are not collected by any government entity,98 news ac-
counts reveal that these killings do occur.99  And when they do, the legal 
 
 93. See, e.g., Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 407 (holding that the death penalty is uncon-
stitutional when applied to child rape); Coker, 433 U.S. at 584 (holding that the death 
penalty is unconstitutional when applied to adult rape). 
 94. MO. REV. STAT. § 563.046.3(2) (2000). 
 95. 18 U.S.C. § 3591 (2012). 
 96. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977) (“We therefore will not 
disturb the balance struck in previous cases holding that the Due Process Clause re-
quires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements includ-
ed in the definition of the offense of which the defendant is charged.”). 
 97. The only statute allowing capital punishment for an attempted murder of-
fense is federal statute 18 U.S.C. § 3591(b)(2), which allows the death penalty for 
attempting, authorizing, or advising the killing of any officer, juror, or witness in 
cases involving a continuing criminal enterprise, regardless of whether such killing 
actually occurs.  18 U.S.C. § 3591(b)(2).  However, this statute has not been tested 
before the Supreme Court, and no person is on death row for this offense.  See Death 
Penalty for Offenses Other Than Murder, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-offenses-other-murder (last visited 
Oct. 3, 2015). 
 98. Until the Death in Custody Reporting Act of 2013, law enforcement agencies 
were not required to report the number of homicides caused by their officers.  See 
Death in Custody Reporting Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-242, 128 Stat. 2860 (2014); 
see also Allie Gross & Bryan Schatz, Congress is Finally Going to Make Local Law 
Enforcement Report how many People They Kill, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 17, 2014, 7:00 
AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/12/death-custody-reporting-act-
police-shootings-ferguson-garner. 
 99. For example, one source has collected the names of seventy-six unarmed 
people of color who were killed by police officers between 1999 and 2014.  See 
Juzwiak & Chan, supra note 4. 
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analysis remains the same – a focus on the reasonable belief of the police 
officer.  The tragedy is that this analysis is employed without regard to the 
underlying crime that motivated the police encounter in the first place. 
In recent years, the United States has seen numerous police killings of 
people who were suspected of crimes that would never carry the death penal-
ty in the court system.  An excellent example of the often disproportional 
effect of the death penalty on the streets is the death of Eric Garner in Staten 
Island, New York.100  In July 2014, witnesses say Eric Garner, a forty-three-
year-old father of six, was breaking up a fight when police arrived on the 
scene.101  Officers were allegedly familiar with Mr. Garner because they had 
seen him selling untaxed cigarettes – a crime in New York City.102  This gave 
them probable cause to arrest Mr. Garner for an offense that carries a fine of 
up to $5000 and up to thirty days of imprisonment.103  Mr. Garner, however, 
was never given an opportunity to either plead to or fight his charges.104  He 
was never given the dignity of a court process.105  Instead, an officer held Mr. 
Garner, who suffered from asthma, in an impermissible chokehold, causing 
Mr. Garner to exclaim repeatedly, “I can’t breathe!”106  Mr. Garner later died 
and the city medical examiner declared his death a homicide caused by “the 
compression of his chest and prone positioning during physical restraint by 
police.”107  For what amounted to a misdemeanor offense, Mr. Garner re-
ceived the death penalty – a penalty that would be patently unconstitutional in 
the court system. 
One might argue that the underlying suspected crimes of individuals 
killed by police is often more serious than selling untaxed cigarettes.  How-
ever, even when this is the case, the death penalty is a disproportionate pun-
ishment if the underlying crime is not intentionally causing someone’s death.  
Often, the claim by officers is that the individual was somehow resisting ar-
rest.108  In many jurisdictions, resisting arrest is treated only as a misdemean-
 
 100. Judith Browne Dianis, Eric Garner Was Killed by More Than Just a Choke-
hold, MSNBC (Aug. 5, 2014, 9:43 AM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/what-killed-
eric-garner. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id.; see also N.Y. TAX LAW § 1814 (McKinney 2015). 
 103. § 1814(h)(2). 
 104. Browne Dianis, supra note 100. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Jake Pearson, Eric Garner’s Death by Police Chokehold Ruled a Homicide, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 1, 2014, 3:27 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/
08/01/eric-garner-homicide_n_5642481.html. 
 108. This was the claim made by the officers involved in Eric Garner’s situation.  
See C.J. Sullivan, Man Dies After Suffering Heart Attack During Arrest, N.Y. POST 
(July 18, 2014, 1:00 AM), http://nypost.com/2014/07/18/man-dies-after-suffering-
heart-attack-during-arrest/.  However, there are a host of such stories.  See, e.g., 
KCKPD: Man Dies After Resisting Arrest, Brief Struggle with Police, 41 ACTION 
NEWS (May 23, 2014, 6:23 AM), http://www.kshb.com/news/crime/kckpd-man-dies-
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or and carries, at most, twelve months of imprisonment – a far cry from the 
death penalty.109  Even if an officer claims that the individual resisting arrest 
assaulted the officer in a serious manner, at most that offense carries thirty 
years to life imprisonment.110  A sentence of death would clearly be cruel and 
unusual in our court system.  Yet, we have tolerated such disrespect for hu-
man dignity for the death penalty on the streets through the application of 
disproportionate punishment. 
B.  Death Cannot Be Mandatory: The Need for Alternate Choices 
Another manner in which the Supreme Court has respected human dig-
nity in the death penalty context is by prohibiting statutes that make death a 
mandatory penalty.  In the 1976 case Woodson v. North Carolina, the Su-
preme Court addressed the constitutionality of a North Carolina statute stat-
ing that certain deliberate and premeditated murders shall be punishable by 
death.111  In coming to its conclusion that such a statute was unconstitutional, 
the Court again noted the “unique and irreversible” nature of the death penal-
ty.112  The Court explored the country’s history of moving away from the 
mandatory imposition of such a final and severe sentence.113  In its written 
opinion in Woodson, the Court quoted Chief Justice Burger’s dissent in Fur-
man v. Georgia,114 in which he said that the change from mandatory death 
 
after-after-resisting-arrest-brief-struggle-with-police; Victorville Man Dies After Be-
ing Tased Due To Resisting Arrest, VICTOR VALLEY NEWS (Aug. 13, 2014), 
http://www.vvng.com/victorville-man-dies-after-being-tased-due-to-resisting-arrest/; 
Cole Reichenberg, Montana Man Shot and Killed After Resisting Arrest in California, 
THE MOOSE 95.1 FM (Oct. 28, 2013), http://mooseradio.com/montana-man-shot-and-
killed-after-resisting-arrest-in-california/; Alex Cabrero, Sevier County Man Killed 
After Resisting DUI Arrest, KSL (July 30, 2011), http://www.ksl.com/?
nid=148&sid=16591865. 
 109. For example, if Eric Garner had been convicted of resisting arrest under New 
York law, his punishment would have been for a class A misdemeanor, which carries 
a maximum penalty of only one year of imprisonment.  N.Y. PENAL LAW § 205.30 
(McKinney 2015); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.15 (McKinney 2015).  In Michael Brown’s 
case, resisting arrest in Missouri can be a class A misdemeanor, punishable by up to 
one year of imprisonment.  MO. REV. STAT. § 575.150 (2000); MO. REV. STAT. § 
558.011 (2000).  It can also be a class E felony if the person resists by fleeing and 
creates a substantial risk of serious physical injury or death to any person, punishable 
by up to four years of imprisonment.  MO. REV. STAT. § 575.150; MO. REV. STAT. § 
558.011. 
 110. For instance, under Missouri law, assault of a police officer is a class A felo-
ny, which carries ten to thirty years imprisonment, and in some cases life imprison-
ment.  MO. REV. STAT. § 565.081 (2000); MO. REV. STAT. § 558.011. 
 111. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 286 (1976). 
 112. Id. at 287. 
 113. Id. at 298–99. 
 114. Id. at 297 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 402 (1972) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting)). 
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sentences “was greeted by the Court as a humanizing development.”115  
Therefore, the Court condemned the use of a mandatory death penalty as go-
ing beyond “the limits of civilized standards.”116 
In keeping with these civilized standards of humanity, the Woodson 
Court also noted juries’ reluctance to believe that a death sentence is appro-
priate in every case of intentional and premeditated murder.  As the Court 
explained, juries in North Carolina at the time were often declining to render 
guilty verdicts because of the severity of the punishment of death that would 
be mandated against the defendant.117  The same is true today.  Juries across 
the United States impose the death penalty in only about three percent of eli-
gible cases.118  This indicates that, when given the discretion to do so, jurors 
usually believe that even an intentional murderer has some redeeming value 
and is deserving of life.  This was an important recognition in leading the 
Woodson Court to decide that a mandatory death penalty scheme is cruel and 
unusual.  As the Court poetically put it: 
A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the charac-
ter and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the 
particular offense excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate 
punishment of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating 
factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind. It treats all 
persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual 
human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to 
be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death.119 
What the Supreme Court is really acknowledging is that people are more 
than what they have done and that juries tend to realize this as well when 
given mitigating information about an individual.  It is in this way that the 
death penalty jurisprudence incorporates a respect for human dignity into 
even the most severe and final sentence. 
In Woodson, the Court recognized that North Carolina’s mandatory sen-
tencing law was meant to protect against jurors imposing the death penalty in 
an arbitrary fashion.  However, as the Court recognized, a mandatory ap-
proach goes too far in the opposite direction – leaving no room for a jury’s 
consideration of factors that may warrant a sentence less than death and giv-
 
 115. Id. at 298 (citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 402). 
 116. Id. at 301 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)). 
 117. Id. at 302–03. 
 118. See Hugo A. Bedau, The Case Against the Death Penalty, ACLU, 
https://www.aclu.org/case-against-death-penalty (last updated 2012) (“Of all those 
convicted on a charge of criminal homicide, only 3 percent – about 1 in 33 – are even-
tually sentenced to death.”). 
 119. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305. 
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ing no meaningful guidance in how such a consideration should be made.120  
The Court clarifies that, rather than just replacing the judgment of juries with 
a mandatory penalty, legislatures are supposed to provide “objective stand-
ards to guide, regularize, and make rationally reviewable the process for im-
posing a sentence of death.”121  Thus, the death penalty in the court system 
respects human dignity, not only through disallowing the death penalty to be 
mandatory, but also by putting objective standards and procedures in place to 
prevent a jury’s potentially arbitrary decisions.  The same certainly has not 
been true for the death penalty on the streets. 
While the death penalty on the streets is not a mandatory sanction, it 
suffers from the same deficiencies that plagued mandatory death penalty 
schemes.  For instance, when police officers kill individuals, their decision 
does not take into account the fact that many people in society would object 
to the view that the suspect was deserving of death in that instance.  One need 
only look to recent controversies involving police killings for proof of that 
point.122  Instead of focusing on the humanity of the individual, analyses of 
the legality of deadly police force are preoccupied with the actions of the 
suspected criminal.  Death, though, whether it is imposed through the court 
system or on the streets at the hand of law enforcement, is an irreversible and 
severe outcome.  Thus, its imposition should not be tolerated without regard 
for the suspect’s right to live.  This suggestion is not meant to diminish the 
importance of the lives of police officers, nor is it meant to ignore the on-the-
scene decisions that police officers have to make in deciding whether deadly 
force is appropriate.  Rather, the purpose of comparing the death penalty on 
the streets to the death penalty in the courts is to encourage a place for the 
humanity of the suspect in the analysis of whether deadly force ought to be 
used in a particular situation. 
   
 
 120. Id. at 303 (“North Carolina’s mandatory death penalty statute provides no 
standards to guide the jury in its inevitable exercise of the power to determine which 
first-degree murderers shall live and which shall die.”). 
 121. Id. 
 122. For instance, there are a number of accounts online asserting the opinion that 
victims of police violence did not have to die.  See, e.g., Autumn Alston, If Michael 
Brown Robbed a Store, He Still Didn’t Deserve to Die, LIBERAL AM. (Aug. 15, 2014), 
http://www.liberalamerica.org/2014/08/15/if-michael-brown-robbed-a-store-he-still-
didnt-deserve-to-die/; PenrS, Michael Brown Did Not Deserve to Die!, DAILY KOS 
(Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2014/08/15/1321955/-Michael-
Brown-Did-Not-Deserve-to-Die; Richard Anthony, Michael Brown and Eric Garner 
Didn’t Have to Die, UFP NEWS (Dec. 23, 2014), http://universalfreepress.com/
michael-brown-eric-garner-didnt-die/; Jonathan Capehart, Tamir Rice and Michael 
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Instead of treating criminal suspects in police encounters “as members 
of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of 
the penalty of death[,]”123 the perspective should be that all individuals are 
deserving of a chance at life.  Just as juries in capital cases often choose a 
sanction less severe than death for deliberate murderers, the law ought to 
encourage police officers to choose non-lethal force in most encounters – 
even with those individuals who have allegedly threatened the life of a police 
officer or others.  The truth is that police departments do not receive much by 
way of training, resource support, and regulation in order to safely turn to 
non-fatal force in most jurisdictions.124  A debilitating shot to the leg may be 
sufficient to contain a fleeing felon, making a fatal shot to the back of the 
head unnecessary.  Backup officers can be called in to show force, rather than 
using deadly force, in the case of unruly suspects.  Officers can be more regu-
larly outfitted with less lethal equipment, such as Tasers, to be used in any 
situations where it would be safe for officers to do so.125  And, in some cases, 
unarmed, fleeing suspects can be allowed to flee because officers have their 
identifying information and can apprehend them later under less volatile con-
ditions.  Because the law of excessive force does not speak to these alternate 
procedures, the death penalty on the street is very similar to the flawed man-
datory death penalty schemes in that it too lacks “objective standards to 
guide, regularize, and make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a 
sentence of death.”126  Instead, we are left with a Fourth Amendment reason-
ableness analysis that does not focus on ways to avoid the deaths of everyday 
individuals. 
 
 123. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304. 
 124. In his grand jury testimony, Darren Wilson, the officer who shot and killed 
the unarmed Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, explained that in his department 
there is usually only one Taser available, and he does not carry it because it is uncom-
fortable to do so.  Grand Jury Transcript, supra note 26, at 205:18–23.  Most police 
are trained using a force continuum, which allows for increased degrees of force as 
the encounter elevates.  See The Use-of-Force Continuum, NAT’L INST. JUST. (Aug. 4, 
2009), http://www.nij.gov/topics/law-enforcement/officer-safety/use-of-force/pages/
continuum.aspx.  This is very different from de-escalating a dangerous situation in 
order to be able to safely use non-lethal force, which is the method for which this 
Article advocates.  See id. 
 125. Though the use of Tasers is not without its own problems, and it certainly 
can be abused, there is increasing evidence that using Tasers can de-escalate a police 
encounter.  See, e.g., Stephanie Taylor, Police Train for Taser Use; Authorities Say 
They Keep Incidents From Turning More Violent, TUSCALOOSA NEWS (Feb. 9, 2015, 
11:00 PM), http://www.tuscaloosanews.com/article/20150209/news/150209541. 
 126. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303. 
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V.  A HUMAN DIGNITY STANDARD REQUIRES PROCEDURAL 
PROTECTIONS BEFORE POLICE FORCE IS REASONABLE 
Without a consideration of whether an officer could have used non-
deadly force before resorting to deadly force in a confrontation, the consid-
eration of whether that officer’s actions were reasonable has no ready mean-
ing.  If the Eighth Amendment’s human dignity standard was incorporated 
into the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry for claims of excessive 
police force, then a requirement of procedural protections of life would have 
room in the analysis.  The purpose of this Article is not to suggest what those 
protections should be in every case, but rather to make the case for the need 
for procedural protections of life in the use of force by police officers.  There 
are many entities that are equipped to suggest the types of non-lethal force 
protocols that can safely be used in a variety of police encounters.127  What 
this Article is meant to argue is that an officer’s use of deadly force should 
never satisfy a reasonable standard unless that officer employed appropriate 
non-lethal alternatives before turning to the use of deadly force.  Certainly, 
there may be some situations in which non-lethal force is deemed unsafe to 
the officer or other involved individuals.  However, considering non-lethal 
alternatives is not the same as asking if an officer reasonably believed that the 
suspect was going to use deadly force against the officer or others.  Even in 
some situations when the answer to the traditional reasonableness questions is 
in the affirmative, a human dignity standard would call for the use of non-
fatal force if it could safely be applied to contain the suspect. 
The Portland Police Department’s internal investigation of the Aaron 
Campbell shooting spoke of several non-fatal force alternatives that could 
have been employed by the officer in that situation.  The report spoke of the 
use of a bean bag strike, as well as a K9 option.  In not considering these al-
ternatives, the investigation report concluded that “Officer Frashour failed to 
weigh all options and tools, consider the totality of the situation, and to de-
escalate his mindset, prior to the use of lethal force.”128  Weighing all of the 
options and tools and employing de-escalation methods are just the sort of 
procedural protections that must be built into the reasonableness standard for 
police force.  A reasonable officer – one who is truly trying to avoid the loss 
of the suspect’s life – will turn to non-lethal force first and will use methods 
of diffusing tension before employing the death penalty on the streets.  The 
law should call for such respect for human dignity by police officers.  That is 
the solution for which the “Hands Up” and #BlackLivesMatter movements 
 
 127. Police departments themselves are a prime institution to develop non-lethal 
force protocols to be followed before fatal force is applied.  Community organizations 
can also have a voice in the sort of force that they would agree to be subjected to 
before deadly force is applied.  Of course, once a non-lethal alternative requirement is 
built into the law, even entrepreneurs and other companies may step in with innova-
tions in the development of non-lethal weaponry to sell to police departments. 
 128. USE OF FORCE REVIEW BD., supra note 57. 
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are pleading.  That is what the Eighth Amendment teaches is the way to 
properly employ punishment. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Comparing the death penalty in the court system to the death penalty on 
the streets demonstrates the utter lack of procedural protections afforded to 
individuals against deadly police force.  Rather than requiring that non-fatal 
force be used when it is safe to do so, the law merely requires that police of-
ficers act reasonably in their decisions to use deadly force.  This reasonable-
ness standard has no true, satisfying meaning, however, because there is no 
consensus on what constitutes reasonable police action – either in the law, 
police protocol across the nation, or societal perceptions of appropriate police 
behavior.  Therefore, when the issue of police reasonableness arises in the 
death penalty on the street – when a police officer has used deadly force 
against an individual as punishment – we are left with inconsistent results 
and, most tragically, the unnecessary loss of life.  In order to make the death 
penalty on the streets more consistent with the death penalty in the court sys-
tem, the Supreme Court ought to incorporate an Eighth Amendment respect 
for human dignity standard into the Fourth Amendment reasonableness anal-
ysis when claims of excessive force are brought against police officers.  Do-
ing so will refocus the force question from whether an officer felt threatened 
by a suspect to what officers should have done before turning to deadly force.  
This analysis will necessarily require the development of fatal force protocols 
that train officers in the use of non-lethal force and support police depart-
ments in providing officers with the resources to safely employ non-deadly 
force – even in non-contentious situations.  The Eighth Amendment provides 
an excellent framework for respecting the lives of even those suspected of 
criminal activity – an approach that is crucial when we begin to accept the 
deadly use of force by police officers as the death penalty on the streets. 
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